Abstract. This article examines factors that motivate major powers to participate in humanitarian interventions, with a case study of US intervention in Somalia during the period 1992-93. Two potential explanations are assessed: First, the ar ticle considers the conventional p erspective that the Un i ted States interven ti on was guided by hu m a n i t a rian con s i dera ti on s , particularly a desire to attenuate effects of famine,war, and political disorder in Somalia. Second,US intervention may have reflected realpolitik considerations, e.g. maintaining control over traditional spheres of influence for re a s ons of n a ti onal power and pre s ti ge , as well as gaining access to potential oil supplies. While altruistic concerns may have had some influence on US conduct, this study finds that humanitarianism was (at best) mixed with considerations of national interest.
Introduction
With the termination of the Cold War, it is often asserted that international relati ons no lon ger have a basic logic or com m on thre ad . A con tra ry vi ew holds that m a ny analys t s' con f u s i on abo ut world po l i tics stems from the irrel eva n ce of re a l i s t p a rad i gm s . In deed , Ch a rles Kegl ey 's 1993 Pre s i den tial Ad d ress to the In tern a ti on a l Studies Association raised the possibility of realism's obsolescence for the current era. Kegley argued that recent events could herald a return to Wilsonian idealism. 2 The view that we have entered a "neo-Wilsonian" era is widespread.
One manifestation of this neo-Wilsonianism is the rise of humanitarian interventi on . It appe a rs that the po s t -Cold War era has finally inaugura ted a world order where great powers use their military force not as an expression of realpolitik, as was true earlier, but as a technique to restore democratic governance, overcome famine, or pro tect minori ti e s . Even Jack Don n elly, a skepti c , ack n owl ed ges that "hu m a n rights and issues of humanitarian politics more generally, have achieved an international prominence at least as great as at any other time in modern history." 3 Hu m a n i t a rian interven ti on also has tra n s form ed the ideo l ogical ch a racter of deb a te on intern a ti onal rel a ti on s . L i beral activi s t s , of ten of feminist and/or pac i f i s t orientation, and hostile to foreign intervention, have in recent years become enthusia s tic su pporters of the con cept , provi ded that interven ti on is of the hu m a n i t a ri a n variety. Indeed, in the debate over intervention in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Kosovo, many of the strongest advocates of force had previously been staunch opponents of US intervention in Vietnam or Central America during the Cold War. 4 This article examines hu m a n i t a rian interven ti on in the case of Opera ti on Re s tore Hope in Somalia during December 1992-May 1993.
Humanitarian intervention may be defined as f orceful interference in the internal politics of one country, undertaken by another country or count ries, motivated primarily by altruistic considerations. Such interventions have often been undertaken in the context of peacekeeping operations, although humanitarian intervention differs in key aspects from classical pe ace keep i n g. In classical pe ace keep i n g, i n tern a ti on a l m i l i t a ry forces are assu m ed to ref rain from any interven ti on in the affairs of t h e co u n try or co u n tries wh ere they opera te . Pe ace keepers are dep l oyed on ly with the permission of the affected parties, and they adhere to the norm of nonintervention and strict impartiality. 5 Humanitarian intervention, by contrast, has dropped the nonintervention injunction and, by implication,the doctrine of impartiality -if impartiality means that the interveners fail to take sides. In cases of humanitarian int ervention, the int erveners are supposed to take sides. 6 The most important point, however, is that the intervening power, acting on hu m a n i t a rian gro u n d s , should serve univers a l i s tic goals comm on to all hu m a n i ty; the power must also esch ew parochial con s i dera ti ons of national interest, which tend to compromise the operation's humanitarian character.
As a corollary, countries that field troops in humanitarian interventions ought not use the opera ti on as a cover to furt h er their own intere s t s . Su ch an activi ty wo u l d clearly violate basic norms of humanitarian intervention and would, at least, compromise the mission's purported hu m a n i t a rian inten t . Herein is the key probl em : How does one know wh et h er or not an interven ti on is "hu m a n i t a ri a n" and that national interests actually are eschewed? How can one know whether official claims to humanitarian intent are genuine or are mere pretenses or rationalizations for foreign policies based on old fashioned notions of national or mat erial interests? These are questions to be examined in the Somalia case.
An important component for any theory of humanitarian intervention would be a conception of conditions that make such interventions possible and ensure that participants serve cosmopolitan interests. Three factors may be offered: First, humanitarian interventions are generally multilateral operations undertaken simultaneously by several countries. Such multilateralism tends to dilute the influence of any single s t a te and increase the likel i h ood that intern a ti onal and co s m opolitan interests are served by the operation. Purportedly humanitarian operations undertaken unilatera lly by a single state , su ch as Fren ch pe ace keeping in Rwanda or va rious Ru s s i a n operations in the former USSR are therefore suspect, although they may be endorsed by the UN Security Council. 7 Truly humanitarian operations are presumed to have a broad multinational character, both in the operation's overall spirit and in the way forces are constituted.
Second, humanitarian operations are expected to obtain prior authorization from the United Nations Security Council, to ensure further that national interests of participating powers will not corrupt the operation. The UN is thus expected, at least in pri n c i p l e , to undert a ke some su pervi s ory functi on . To be su re , this principle was we a ken ed by recent NATO bom bing in Ko s ovo and Serbi a , i n i ti a ted wi t h o ut UN authorization. Whether and to what extent this will set a new precedent remains to be seen. This exception notwithstanding, some degree of UN involvement is generally considered a sin qua non for humanitarian interventions in the post-Cold War era.
Th i rd , and most import a n t , hu m a n i t a rian opera ti ons are usu a lly undert a ken in regions believed to be of marginal economic or strategic value. This fact is often cited as evi den ce that specific opera ti ons are hu m a n i t a rian in su b s t a n ce , as well as in name. According to this logic, a realist state would not intervene in such st rategically marginal regions as Somalia since this would constitute a waste of resources. Thus the US intervention in Somalia must imply humanitarian motives. 8 Great powers are motiva ted to parti c i p a te in hu m a n i t a rian opera ti ons for re a s ons of pri n c i p l e ; con s i dera ti ons of n a ti onal intere s t , i f not absen t , a re moved into the backgro u n d . The basic probl em is this: Advoc a tes of hu m a n i t a rian interven ti on too of ten a s sume altru i s tic motiva ti on s , wi t h o ut dem on s tra ting their salien ce thro u gh em p i ri c a l re s e a rch . Re a l i s t s , in con tra s t , tend to be so skeptical of hu m a n i t a rian motiva ti ons that t h ey avoid the qu e s ti on altoget h er. 9 The crucial third factor -rega rding the stra tegi c i rrel eva n ce of t a r get co u n tries -espec i a lly is asserted more of ten than it is dem on s tra ted . Th ere is, of co u rs e , the danger of t a uto l ogical re a s on i n g. That hu m a n i t a rian interven ti ons occur in stra tegi c a lly marginal areas may be "dem on s tra ted " by interven ti on of mu l ti l a teral forces in su ch regi ons is one su ch tauto l ogy.
Post-Cold War humanitarian interventions may not reflect altruistic motivations of p a rti c i p a ting state s . In tern a ti onal interven ti on in Somalia is an excell ent case study since it was one of the largest and most complex cases of humanitarian interven ti on undert a ken to date . This assessment of fers no com preh en s ive analysis of what caused US and intern a ti onal interven ti on . In s te ad , I focus on the con du ct of the intervention after the initial deployment. In par ticular, I assess the most significant and controversial feature of the peacekeeping operation -the decision by the US and the UN Secretariat to begin a process of military confrontation with the militia of Mohammed Farah Aideed. In the process of analyzing these events, we reassess the thesis that this operation was motivated by altruistic mot ivations and was not substantially influenced by US or other national interests.
Origins of Operation Restore Hope
Although it has become commonplace to view Somalia as of little strategic or econ omic intere s t , this was not alw ays the percepti on . Du ring the Cold Wa r, i n deed , Somalia was accorded an important strategic status. The significance of the country was pri m a ri ly its geogra phic loc a ti on -close to Red Sea shipping lanes and, m ore important, the Bab-el-Mandeb straits. The latter is a narrow channel of water, located where the Arabian Peninsula almost (but not quite) meets the African continent. Through this channel passes most of the oil shipments that travel between the Persian Gu l f and We s tern Eu rope . The Ba b -el -Ma n deb "ch o kepoi n t ," as it has been termed, was considered a major area of interest for the US military during the course of the Cold War, and was depicted -not altogether accurately -as the economic lifeline of Western Europe. 10 Somalia's shoreline lay close to the Bab-el-Mandeb.
Western interest in Somalia grew considerably during the 1970s,partly in response to the OPEC oil embargo of that decade and subsequently heightened interest in oil and oil-shipping. During this period, Somalia was ruled by the military dictatorship of Mo h a m m ed Si ad Ba rre . O ri gi n a lly Sovi et -b acked , Si ad Ba rre sought and ga i n ed Western support beginning in 1978. The United States eagerly supported his regime, despite its nominally Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, and replaced the Soviet Union as the principal source of aid. Other NATO powers, notably Italy, the former colonial ruler, supplied substantial support as well. 11 In retu rn , Si ad Ba rre all owed the Un i ted States access to the Sovi et -built nava l base at Berbera in the north of the country not far from the Bab-el-Mandeb, as well as the southern port of Kismayu. A considerable amount of effort was spent upgrading these cities' infrastructure during the 1980s for eventual use by the US Central Command. Berbera did not actually become a permanent base for the US Navy, but the Navy clearly sought to make the base available in the event of need. In response, Si ad Ba rre received econ omic and military aid, as well as diplom a tic su pport that proved crucial to his regi m e . Bet ween 1979 and 1991, Somalia received over $800 million in both economic and military aid from the United States. 12 As Cold War tensions abated, Somalia and the Bab-el-Mandeb straits declined in geostrategic importance. But it would be wrong to assume that the Bab-el-Mandeb and Somalia lost all significance for Western d efense planners. US Senate testimony by General Norman Schwarzkopf in 1990 reaffirmed the strategic importance of this area. Securing this area was a major objective of the US Central Command during the post-Cold War era:
The Red Se a , with the Suez Canal in the north and the Ba b -elMandeb in the south, is one of the most vital sea lines of communication and a critical shipping link between our Pacific and European all i e s . . . Si n ce a significant part of U S C E N TC O M 's force s would deploy by sea, ensuring these waterways remain open to free world shipping must be a key objective. 13 And Gen eral Schw a r z kopf ad ded : "Access to fac i l i ties in Somalia con ti nues to be a part of USCENTCOM's regional strategy." Overall,it is important to note that Somalia was not so remote from Western strategic interests as is commonly believed. The Si ad Ba rre regime began to disintegra te at the end of the 1980s due to a com bin a ti on of declining produ cti on of Som a l i a's principal ex ports (hide s , m e a t , c a t t l e , b a n a n a s ) 1 4 and growing dom e s tic oppo s i ti on to the incre a s i n gly repre s s ive and mega l om a n i acal rule of Si ad Ba rre . Al t h o u gh Somalia is rel a tively hom ogen eous with vi rtu a lly the whole pop u l a ti on speaking Somali and practicing Is l a m , the co u n try remains divi ded by regi on , cl a n , and su b -clan gro u p i n gs . The oppo s i ti on to Si ad Ba rre accord i n gly ra i s ed militias based on clan all egi a n ce , u n i ted on ly on the basis of oppo s i ti on to the regi m e . Wh en Si ad Ba rre was driven from Mogad i s hu in Ja nu a ry 1991, the oppo s i ti on m i l i tias tu rn ed on one another, reducing most of the co u n try to the anarchic Hobbe s i a n s t a te of n a tu re that has been a staple of Somali po l i tics to the pre s ent day.
The Role of Aideed
Mo h a m m ed Fa rah Ai deed had been a key player in the overt h row of the Si ad Ba rre dict a tors h i p, a n d , a f terw a rds was a major factor in the co u n try 's de s t a bi l i z ati on . Ai deed had long oppo s ed the regime and spent several ye a rs in a po l i ti c a l prison. At other times, he had served Siad Barre as military commander and, in his last official po s i ti on , as Am b a s s ador to India -pre su m a bly a form of d i p l om a ti c exile. In 1989, he joined the United Somali Congress (USC), a key opposition group based in Rome and headed by Ali Mahdi, a rich hotel proprietor. Aideed opened an Ethiopia office for the USC and proceeded to organize a military force to infiltrate i n to the co u n try. 1 5 L a ter, Ai deed would break with Mahdi in a stru ggle for power during the final days of the old regime. Aideed and Mahdi, now with separate militia forces, would emerge as the principal protagonists in battle for control of Mogadishu after Siad Barre fled in early 1991.
On Decem ber 9, 1 9 9 2 , Opera ti on Re s tore Hope was launch ed and 28,000 US forces stormed ashore in Mogadishu in what was described by Le Monde as the "most media saturated (mediatisé) landing in military history." 16 Twenty-four other countries sent additional contingents, 17 although the American forces exceeded in size the com bi n ed forces of a ll other parti c i p a ting co u n tri e s . Robert Oakley, a form er US ambassador to Somalia, was appointed by President George Bush to direct the operation, with the title of Special Presidential Envoy.
Operation Restore Hope began with a high level of cooperation between the United States and Aideed. In fact, Aideed at first expressed a respectful attitude toward the United States and welcomed US intervention. Aideed's pro-American views stemmed f rom a close rel a ti onship he en j oyed with the US-based Con ti n ental Oil Com p a ny (Conoco). Apparently, Aideed expected that his ties to Conoco would promote close relations between him and Ambassador Oakley and US forces.
At the same time, Aideed was intensely hostile towards the United Nations and in particular to UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. This animosity was longstanding. Prior to his work at the UN, Boutros-Ghali had been an Egyptian diplom a t , and a su pporter of the Si ad Ba rre dict a tors h i p. 1 8 More import a n t ly, in 1991, Egypt co-sponsored a meeting of Somali political figures at which Aideed's rival Ali Mahdi was decl a red "pre s i den t" of Som a l i a . The title of pre s i dent was essen ti a lly m e a n i n gless since Mahdi was never able to con trol even the capital, l et alone the whole co u n try. However, this event establ i s h ed that Egypt , and by implicati on Boutros-Ghali, was partial and opposed to the interests of Aideed and his supporters.
Aideed's attitude toward Operation Restore Hope can thus be politely termed as complicated. On the one hand, Aideed strongly favored the American role while, on the other hand, Aideed was critical of the organization that had endorsed the operati on and had given it legal legi ti m ac y, i . e . the Un i ted Na ti on s . Ai deed su rely mu s t have been concerned when US troops landed in December, since it was made clear that this unilateral intervention would be brief. It was always intended that the Opera ti on would lay the gro u n dwork for a full -f l ed ged UN pe ace keeping opera ti on in Somalia, to be administered by the UN Secretariat.
In any case, Aideed's supporters proceeded to praise the United States, while they a t t acked the UN. O a k l ey and the Am erican forces retu rn ed the com p l i m ent and worked closely with Aideed. Several days after landing, US forces discovered a large a rms cache bel on ging to the Ai deed facti on , containing significant qu a n ti ties of h e avy we a pon s , a ll within one bl ock of the cl o s ed US em b a s s y, but they took no action. 19 Alex De Waal, director of African Rights and formerly with Human Rights Watch, provides the following account: So Oakley co s i ed up to Gen eral Ai deed . For ex a m p l e ,O a k l ey chose to rent his house from Ai deed 's ch i ef f i n a n c i er Osman "Ato," u s e Ai deed 's mon eych a n gers for the lu c ra tive business of converting US do ll a rs to Somali shill i n gs , and gave the Gen eral a series of p u bl i c rel a ti ons coups by heralding "bre a k t h ro u gh s" in pe ace talks that had in fact been nego ti a ted by UN diplomats some months earl i er. 2 0
Ai deed told a form er US ambassador that, " 'O n ly Am erican diplom a t s'. . . co u l d understand Somalis' differences, solve the country's political problems, and bring its people together... 'Only American t roops,' he added for good measure, were 'imparti a l , d i s i n tere s ted , and wel come among Somalis as pe ace keeping force s .' " 2 1 U S favoritism toward Aideed occurred despite evidence that Aideed had intermittently co ll a bora ted with the govern m ent of Su d a n , wh i ch was perceived as a purveyor of Islamic fundamentalist ideo l ogy and an en emy of the Un i ted State s . On the other hand, despite ties to Sudan, Aideed's organization remained essentially secular, more driven by a hunger for power than by ideology. 22 And, Aideed's Sudanese flirtations a pp a ren t ly were out wei gh ed in the eyes of the Am ericans by his close assoc i a ti on with Conoco, the largest US investor in the country. Although in this initial phase the United States and the entire peacekeeping operation were technically neutral, there was a strong sentiment among the other factions that Oakley was not really neutral and instead was promoting Aideed's ambitions at the expense of arch-rival Mahdi. This perception became embarrassing for Oakley, particularly when he initiated a series of peace conferences to work out cooperation a m ong the va rious militias and, at one con feren ce in Addis Ab a b a , Ai deed bega n boasting about his US connections. This caused the State Department to complain directly to Oakley about the perception of favoritism. In addition, Boutros-Ghali was incensed by Aideed's continued vituperation against the United Nations (and against Boutros-Ghali personally), and this, too, became a source of complaint. The Financial Ti m e s reported that, "Some angry UN officials all ege priva tely that the US is en co u ra ging the anti-UN camp, and as a con ce s s i on to [Gen eral] Ai deed has breached a number of agreements, such as operating under a UN flag and providing proper security to the UN." 23 In the context of these objections, Oakley began to distance himself from Aideed or to project the impression that distance was being created. On January 7, with cons i dera ble fanfare , Am erican forces attacked an arms depot bel on ging to Ai deed 's m i l i tia in Mogad i s hu ; h el i copter gunships and arm ored veh i cles were used to dislodge pro-Aideed forces. In an interview with the author, Oakley acknowledged that he was receiving complaints from several directi ons abo ut all eged US parti a l i ty toward Aideed; in response, he told critics that they should "wait twenty four hours." The next day the attacks against the arms depot com m en ced . 2 4 And in his coa ut h ored mem oi rs , O a k l ey notes that the raid "p ut an en d , at least tem pora ri ly to rumors of favoritism." 25 General Aideed was surprisingly understanding of the whole situation and -perhaps feeling guilty about his earlier boasting that had been so awkward for Oakley -the gen eral did not publ i cly cri ti c i ze the ra i d . In deed , he con ti nu ed to praise the Un i ted States even as he con ti nu ed to attack the UN. According to a form er US diplomat,"US intervention is quite different in Aideed's mind from foreign intervention and is much more acceptable." 26 At the January 1983 Addis Ababa peace conference, Aideed continued to adopt an intransigent position, demanding that other faction leaders acknowledge his dominance. 27 Apparently, he continued to believe that he had US support, and this was confirmed by events. During the conference, a battle took place in the southern port city of Kismayu, where pro-Aideed forces under Omar Jess were seeking to hold the city against attacks by Said Hersi (known by his nom de guerre, "Morgan"). The battle was crucial since Kismayu was a major port in the southern sector of the country and a strategic prize. In late January, the United States intervened with helicopters, supported by Belgian ground forces which attacked Morgan's troops as they prepared an attack. 28 This move enabled Aideed ally Jess to retain control of Kismayu, at least for the time bei n g. O a k l ey pers on a lly inform ed Ai deed of the hel i copter attack , wh i ch undoubtedly must have been pleasing to the warlord.
The Politics of Oil
Somalia had long been known to the intern a ti onal oil indu s try as a po ten ti a l s o u rce of u n t a pped cru de . Si z a ble oil finds in nei gh boring Yem en in the 1980s increased interest in Somalia since Somalia lay in the same general geological zone. Although the size of the oil reserves in Somalia and the economics of exploitation are unknown, there can be little doubt that significant reserves do exist. In a 1991 study, the World Bank assessed the potential of eight African countries as petroleum suppliers -Somalia was at the top of the list. 29 Four Am erican oil companies had sign ed ex p l ora tory agreem ents with the Sa i d Ba rre regi m e . Du ring the disorder that fo ll owed the regi m e's co ll a p s e , t h ree of t h e four oil c ompanies abandoned their activities due to the absence of security and the fact that agreements signed with Siad Barre were now unenforceable. Conoco, however, proved more tenacious and retained some of its staff in Mogadishu. 30 Its local director, Raymond Marchand, developed a close relationship with Osman Ato, chief advi s or to Ai deed ; Ato was in fact the own er of the property that con t a i n ed the Con oco com pound in Mogad i s hu . Ato had a lon gstanding con n ecti on with the American oil industry, having worked as a contractor for Western Geophysical Corpora ti on , wh i ch undertook nearly "a ll of Con oco's seismic su rvey work in Som alia." 31 The relationship with Ato proved advantageous for Conoco, since this provided the company with at least some source of security and political protection. 32 Ato and Aideed,in turn, obtained revenues with which to pursue their political and milit a ry ambi ti on s . It is important to note that Con oco's close ties to Ato were well k n own in Somalia -they were a matter of "p u blic notori ety " 3 3 according to on e journalist -even if this association was little reported outside Somalia (at least in the English-language press). Through this connection, Conoco was also linked to Ato's boss, General Aideed.
The Con oco exec utives had excell ent ties to US govern m ent officials as well . It is, a f ter all , not uncom m on for large oil companies to have forei gn policy con n ecti on s , 3 4 but Con oco had the ad d i ti onal adva n t a ge of being vi rtu a lly the on ly functi on i n g Am erican en ti ty in Som a l i a . Du ring the peri od of a n a rchy in 1991-92, the Con oco com pound proved useful for US diplom a t s . Wh en Jan We s tco t t , the US em er gen c y rel i ef coord i n a tor for Som a l i a , paid a visit to Mogad i s hu in April 1991, "s ec u ri ty and l ogi s tical su pport provi ded by the pre s i dent of Con oco -Somalia proved cru c i a l ." 3 5 Con oco also played an important role in planning the logi s tics for the US marine landing in Decem ber 1992. Am erican officials were su f f i c i en t ly pleased that Bri gad i er General Frank Libut ti , a top US com m a n der in Opera ti on Re s tore Hope , s ent a let ter of com m en d a ti on to Con oco's Ma rch a n d , praising his assistance , n o ti n g : "Wi t h o ut Raym on d 's [Ma rch a n d 's] co u ra geous con tri buti ons and selfless servi ce , the [landing] opera ti on would have failed ." 3 6 In ad d i ti on , Con oco officials who were gen era lly well i n form ed on internal po l i tics in Somalia provi ded intell i gen ce to the US mission . Th e Con oco con n ecti ons to US officials in Re s tore Hope were su f f i c i en t ly close that they a ro u s ed hosti l i ty among com peting oil companies with interests in the regi on . 3 7 It is not known whether Conoco actually lobbied the State Department in favor of launching the intervention, but there is no doubt that Conoco executives, as well as those of o t h er oil companies with interests in Som a l i a , were pleased wh en it did occur. An article in the Los Angeles Times noted that,"Industry sources said the companies holding the [Somali exploration] rights to the most promising concessions are h oping that the Bush Ad m i n i s tra ti on's dec i s i on to send US troop s . . . wi ll also hel p protect their multimillion dollar investments there." 38 Wh a tever caused Re s tore Hope to take place , it prob a bly did not re sult from Conoco's urging. Yet, once US forces were on the ground, it seems likely that Conoco i n f lu en ced the con du ct of the opera ti on . The very close rel a ti ons bet ween Con oco staff and top level officials in Operation Restore Hope would have given the company exclusive channels of influence. US officials were so comfortable with these connections that they developed a rather insouciant attitude: The Conoco compound was the headquarters for Oakley and his staff and functioned as the de facto US embassy. At least one US official made a habit of wearing a shirt and hat with the Conoco logo on it, 39 which no doubt made it difficult for Somalis and also some foreign journalists to distinguish between the American government and the Conoco oil company. While Conoco was making itself helpful to US officials, it simultaneously upgraded its already strong connections to Aideed. That Aideed had a record of great brutality and held a world view somewhat distant, at the very least, from the ideals of Jeffersonian democracy are certain. But, Aideed's unsavory qualities 40 did not arouse too much concern among the Conoco officials or Oakley and his staff; after all, they had done business previously with Siad Barre, an equally unpleasant figure.
According to the Rome daily La Repu bbl i c a, e a rly in Opera ti on Re s tore Hope Conoco made an agreement with Aideed that it would continue to back him if, in exchange, Aideed would grant Conoco exclusive rights to all oil exploration activity as soon as his militia establ i s h ed full con tro l . 4 1 In other word s , Con oco sought an arrangement that would freeze out potential competitors, and this seemed advantageous to all parti e s . Con oco evi den t ly assu m ed that Ai deed would be the most promising possibility for a national leader, while Aideed expected Conoco to generate diplomatic support from the United States. 42 It is likely that this alliance with Cono-co was an important factor in Aideed's openly pro-American sentiments at the outset of Opera ti on Re s tore Hope . Ai deed 's Con oco con n ecti on , in short , provi des vi t a l context in comprehending his favorable attitude toward American forces, as well as the willingness of the Americans to advance Aideed's agenda.
This all i a n ce proved short -l ived . In Febru a ry 1993, Con oco exec utives were less than impre s s ed by the military perform a n ce of Ai deed 's ally Omar Jess du ring the battle for con trol of Ki s m ay u . Al t h o u gh Jess had initi a lly rep u l s ed an attack by opposing force s , it requ i red direct Am erican and Bel gian interven ti on . This lesst h a n -s tellar military perform a n ce by one of Ai deed 's key allies cre a ted do u bts that Aideed was the best ho rse to back, so to speak. These fears were confirmed in February when Jess lost control of Kismayu altogether. Accordingly, Conoco switched sides and established a new alliance with Aideed's principal adversary, Ali Mahdi. According to La Repubblica, Aideed discovered that, "Mahdi had signed a temporary ag reement for exclusive oil rights for the time when the war would end. The Americans had dumped [Aideed], since they did not believe he could remain predominant over other clans anymore." 43 Aideed not only lost support from Conoco, but also from the US staff in Operation Restore Hope. With the loss of both Conoco and US support, Aideed began, for the first ti m e , to open ly cri ti c i ze the Am eri c a n s , blaming them for the fall of Kismayu. By the end of February, Aideed "urged supporters in a radio broadcast to turn against the Americans." 44 A wave of rioting by Aideed supporters erupted in the s treets of Mogad i s hu . 4 5 Thus began the long process wh ereby Ai deed became the principal villain,at least from the standpoint of US foreign policy. This negative view of Aideed was quickly adopted by mass media -and it has been adopted retrospectively by some ac ademic accounts of the opera ti on . 4 6 What su ch interpret a ti on s i gn ore , h owever, is the initial peri od of the opera ti on wh en the Am ericans worked closely with Aideed and disregarded his violent background. In any case, the schism between Aideed and the Americans was now clear, and it continued to widen.
In May 1993, Re s tore Hope was term i n a ted and the UN assu m ed a more direct ro l e . The rep l acem ent force for Re s tore Hope , term ed UNOSOM II, 4 7 was at least tech n i c a lly ad m i n i s tered by the UN Sec ret a ri a t . Du ring the UNOSOM II peri od , Ai deed would be furt h er dem on i zed , l e ading to direct military con f ron t a ti on wi t h the UN f orces from June to Oc tober 1993. The decision to use military force against Ai deed was one of the most con troversial -and also one of the most lack lu s teractions in the history of UN peacekeeping operations.
Analysis
A close ex a m i n a ti on of this matter reveals that the con du ct of US forces va ri ed con s i dera bly over ti m e , f rom one of close coopera ti on with Ai deed and favori ti s m toward his position, to a later stance of hostility and ultimately military confrontation. The conventional view is that US confrontation with Aideed resulted from idealistic and bureaucratic considerations. The United States, it is argued, was repelled by Ai deed 's intra n s i gen ce and procl ivi ty tow a rd vi o l en ce ; Am erican and later UN forces over-re acted to the disru pti on that he and his militia were causing by using m i l i t a ry force . In ad d i ti on , the opera ti on su f fered from the familiar bu re a u c ra ti c ph en om en on of "m i s s i on creep," wh ereby a rel a tively limited obj ective of f a m i n e relief evolved into a much broader effort to reconstitute the Somali state; 48 Aideed stood in the way of this expanded objective, reinforcing the atmosphere of hostility. Thus, it was General Aideed's obstructionism, combined with UN objections to the General's amoral tendencies, that led to confrontation.
The above interpretation, by far the most common one of the Somali operation, is not well supported by the facts. It fails for two reasons. First,it assumes consistent US h o s ti l i ty tow a rd Ai deed from the beginning of the opera ti on , growing in inten s i ty over time. As we have seen, this view is mistaken, since there was a close US relationship with the militia ch i ef at the begi n n i n g, on ly later rep l aced by hosti l i ty. Al s o, Ai deed 's less savory qu a l i ties were well known at the initial troop landing, but his ch a racter did not seem to have bo t h ered Oakley, his staff, or their co u n terp a rts in Con oco. A Fren ch journalist noted (with a heavi ly ironic tone) the eagerness wi t h which the Americans sought out Aideed:
To The policy of distance and ultimately confrontation with Aideed was a shift in policy by the peacekeepers, which cannot be explained by the conventional view. A more satisfactory account of these facts is that the United States allowed itself to use the circumstances of a humanitarian intervention,and all the legitimacy that this con ferred , to adva n ce the interests of a US inve s tor, Con oco. Con oco's interests in Somalia may not have caused the intervention -original causes of the operation are not the subject of this essay. I am arguing, instead, that sympathy for Conoco led US forces to act the way they did once on the ground.
This interpretation fits well with the facts and, crucially, accounts for the shift in policy. Conoco had close connections with Aideed's militia at the beginning of the opera ti on and so the Am erican force s , accord i n gly, e s t a bl i s h ed close rel a ti ons wi t h Aideed. When Conoco's relations with Aideed deteriorated after the fall of Kismayu, American forces distanced themselves from Aideed. When Conoco opted to shift its support to Mahdi, the American forces did the same and Mahdi became the fa vored Somali political figure. The parallel between the interests of Conoco and the actions of Am erican troops is clear and impre s s ive . An d , c ru c i a lly, the interpret a ti on that Conoco caused the US to act as it did produces a better fit with historical facts than does the conventional view that emphasizes a combination of idealism and bureaucratic politics as motivating factors.
Let us, f i n a lly, con s i der the Somalia case in light of the theory of hu m a n i t a ri a n intervention, as outlined in the introduction. The theory of humanitarian intervention is above all a theory of constraint. It is presumed that specific states may always be tempted to exploit humanitarian intervention to further that state's own national i n tere s t , t hus com promising the opera ti on's integri ty. Even the most ide a l i s tic analysts implicitly r ecognize that humanitarian or peacekeeping operations can be used as cover for a country seeking to project power and/or to protect its sphere of influen ce . Th ere are three aspects of hu m a n i t a rian interven ti on that con s train su ch po ten ti a lly sel f -i n tere s ted beh avi or. Let us recon s i der these three factors in light of the Somalia case.
The first constraining factor in humanitarian operations is the multinational quality typical of such operations. A second and closely related constraint is UN supervis i on . In the Somali case, n ei t h er factor con s tra i n ed the Un i ted State s . Al t h o u gh Operation Restore Hope was a multinational military force with contributions from twenty nations, the American component constituted such an overwhelming proportion that it is difficult to see how the other nations offered anything but legitimation for the operation. Nor is there any evidence that the UN authorization constrained American policy to any great extent. Indeed, the US continued to work closely with Ai deed in the early phase of the opera ti on de s p i te strong obj ecti ons from the UN Sec ret a ri a t . According to one analys t , "The Sec ret a ry Gen eral (Bo utro s -G h a l i ) acknowledged that the UN cannot undertake any major military operation unless the US participates actively. But when it does, it insists on running the whole show and uses the UN simply as a fig leaf, as in Iraq and Somalia." 50 The third, and potentially most salient constraint on great power opportunism is that Somalia was su ppo s ed to be a co u n try wi t h o ut stra tegic or econ omic sign i f icance. This vie w, although widely held, is ina ccurate. As we have seen, Somalia had l ong been rega rded as stra tegi c a lly important due to its prox i m i ty to oil shipp i n g ro utes thro u gh the Red Sea are a . More import a n t , it was the site of s i gnificant oi l exploration activities by Conoco. Thus, there was little in the way of structural constraint to prevent the United States from using the operation to further its interests if it sought to do so.
It must be em ph a s i zed that this argument does not deny that hu m a n i t a ri a n motives influenced the Somalia operation; evidence presented here does not permit so broad a finding. My purpose here is more limited -to demonstrate the considerations of realpolitik in the Somalia case,and the considerably greater role of such considerations than is commonly recognized. Above all, the Somali case underscores the i m port a n ce of i n -depth and cri tical re s e a rch on pe ace keep i n g. It is too easy to a s sume that pe ace keeping and hu m a n i t a rian opera ti ons are altru i s ti c ; too of ten re s e a rch ers have simply accepted these assu m pti ons wi t h o ut con c rete evi den ce . In the en d , a s s e s s m ents of hu m a n i t a rian interven ti ons should, l i ke everything el s e , be based on critical analysis, rather than wishful thinking. , pp. 1 8 1 -1 9 6 . 8 . It is wi dely bel i eved that Opera ti on Re s tore Hope re su l ted from hu m a n i t a rian motive s em a n a ting from el i te govern m ent circl e s , the mass med i a , a n d / or the gen eral publ i c . Th e l a t ter two el em ents have been em ph a s i zed as part of the so-call ed "CNN ef fect ," wh ereby m edia covera ge gen era ted public pre s su re to "do som et h i n g," wh i ch caused the US interven ti on in Som a l i a . For a cri tical assessment of this ph en om en on ,s ee Steven Livi n gs ton and Todd Eachu s ," Hu m a n i t a rian Crises and US Forei gn Po l i c y: Somalia and the CNN Effect Recon s i dered ," Pol i tical Co m mu n i c a ti o n, Vo l .1 2 , No. 4 (1995 ), pp. 4 1 3 -4 2 9 . 9 . Ken n eth Waltz accord i n gly makes no men ti on of hu m a n i t a rian interven ti on , pe ace keep i n g, or human ri ghts in his analysis of i n tern a ti onal rel a ti ons after the Cold Wa r. See Wa l t z , "Th e E m er ging Stru ctu re of In tern a ti onal Rel a ti on s ," In tern a tional Securi ty, Vo l . 1 8 , No. 2 (1993), pp. 4 4 -8 0 . 1 0 . The re a s on for the qu a l i f i c a ti on is the fo ll owi n g : The military logic assumes that the shipping lanes that pass thro u gh the Ba b -el -Ma n deb are in fact vital for the econ omies of We s tern Eu rope and, i f the shipping lanes were bl ocked , the Eu ropean econ omies would be i rrep a ra bly damaged . This is not re a lly acc u ra te since the shipping lanes were in fact bl ocked due to interm i t tent figh ting bet ween Is raeli and Egyptian forces du ring the peri od 1967-75. Du ring that peri od , oil ships simply ro u n ded the Af rican con ti n en t , wi t h o ut any severe d a m a ge to the Eu ropean econ om i e s . No te that Berbera was loc a ted in what had become by 1991 the de facto state of Som a l i l a n d . Owing to US non recogn i ti on of Som a l i l a n d , the Berbera base was not ref u rbi s h ed and reocc u p i ed du ring Opera ti on Re s tore Hope . However, the US arm ed forces made ex ten s ive rep a i rs to air and port fac i l i ties in Mogad i s hu and several other loc a ti on s . A US businessman with ex peri en ce in Som a l i a , "s tron gly su s pect s" that the US non recogn i ti on policy tow a rd Somaliland re su l ted in part f rom poor rel a ti ons bet ween the Somaliland govern m ent and the principal US oil com p a ny with interests in the regi on , Con oco. In form a ti on from intervi ew with Robert Jack s on , a n i n depen dent oil ex p l ora ti on specialist with ex peri en ce in Som a l i a , n ow based in Tu l s a , O k l a h om a ,U S A . In tervi ew con du cted October 19, 1 9 9 8 . As s oc i a te s ,1 9 9 4 ) , pp. 2 2 -2 6 . 1 6 . Alain Frach on ," L' Opera ti on Mi l i t a i re en Som a l i e ," Le Mo n d e ( Decem ber 10, 1 9 9 2 ) , p. 4 .
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